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It has been a year and a half since martial law was imposed
on the Philippines. After 21 September 1972, a journalist noted
the mood in Manila as follows: "There are many in the Philippines
who are willing to give the President the benefit of the doubt.
There are fewer who are optimistic".1
Five months after declaration of martial law, a "letter from
Manila" steted that: "The Filipinos are ratient people, with a
capacity of seeing and enjoying the ludicrous. So, even now, we
can have a good laugh over what is going on. Our temperatures
are set for a slow burn. So, by and large, we can be sure there
will be no explosions in the near future. But the patience even
of a Filipino can run out', .2
A year and a half after martial law, one may ask again what
the mood in Manila is. A close friend, a coffee shop habitué who
still manages to meet with others to discuss the country's affairs
despite fears of rumor-mongering, wrote recently: "Most of us here
evaluate the situation in very logical terms -- what are we buying
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and what are we paying? Civil liberties, many of us see as
the price for stability and progtess. If the loss of liberties
is temporary, many of us are willing to pay the price. How-
ever, as eac day passes and improvements are slow in coming,
many are asking if the price is right".
Salvador López, president of the University of the
Philippines expressed the situation more eloquently. Knowing
that the university faculty and students are most likely to
be the ones to question the current situation, he said:
We are running a race with catastrophe. For it is
far easier to lose freedom without bloodshed than
to regain freedom without bloodshed. One should
never assume that a people willing to sacrifice
freedom and democracy for the sake of necessary
reforms are prepared to bear the sacrifice indefi-
nitely. Quiescence is not necessarily synonymous
with tranquility. The crucial problem., therefore,
is to determine the precise point at which the
sacrifice ceases to be supportable and grievance
becomes explosive -- the point, in other words, at
which the restitution of civil liberties and the
restoration of representative government becomes
imperative.3
A year and a half later, we may look at the Philippine
situation again and evaluate what has happened. Has martial
law been beneficial to the Filipinos? Are- humor and patience
enough to make people wait? Has the price been right, or is
it likely to be right in the future?
There are some people, of course, to whom the answer to
such questions is clear. Foremost among these are those who
believe that liberty and freedom are ideals one never gambles
with, at any price. To these people, there is nothing that
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can justify martial law. There can only be one evaluation of
the present regime in the Philippines -- it is a failure and
the time for waiting is long past.
There are those who believe that the situation in the
Philippines is so full of false information, propaganda, claims
and counter claims, that to embark on a process of evaluating
advantages and disadvantages of martial law would be futile.
The gulf between those for and against martial law is so wide
that it seems unbridgeable. Events in the Philippines so stoke
the fires of passionate partisanship that to take a pro and
con analytical stance is to invite the ire of both those for
and against the current regime.
The language of Philippine politics have always had an
all-or-nothing ring to it. Filipino politicians have vowed the
"total annihilation!! of opponents and the "wiping out" of
enemies. They have been known to utter zero-sum threats in
a colorful form of verbal overkill. Until recently, however,
this was more hyperbole than fact. It is very disturbing
therefore, that in the days before and after martial law, the
rules of the game seem to have changed. People have actually
been killed or jailed. Threats have become violent acts.
Political analysis, under such a tension-filled situation has
become extremely difficult and risky. Attempts at objective
interpretation are seen as lack of commitment or even cow-
ardice. Commitment to one side of the question becomes a
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prerequisite to expression of views and not to take sides is
to take one side. To the committed partisans, "those who are
not with me are against me". One can sincerely and sadly say
that if this air of strong passions and emotions continue to
permeate the study of politics in the Philippines, scholarship
may well become the main casualty of the current Philippine
conflict.
Suppose, however, we do ask the question -- what is martial
law buying and what is the price? This view point enables us to
evaluate the pros and cons of the existing situation in the
Philippines.
The Pros
Sympathizers of the present regime in the Philippines
point to certain advantages which are widely circulated in
glossy reports such_as One Year of the New Society, Report to
the Nation, Philippine Economic Prospects, etc.4 While some
may doubt the accuracy of the reports and dispute the benefits
claimed, the following are typical of the advantages claimed
by the present regime.
1. Peace and order - the government points to an over-
all drop of 43 per cent in the crime rate in the first year
of martial law. Murder cases were said to have declined by
74 per cent, homicide by 69 per cent, robbery by 54 per cent,
and parricide by 148 per cent.5 About half a million firearms
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were allegedly confiscated or surrendered together with 1.5
million rounds of ammunition. Close to 100,000 of the firearms
involved were claimed to be high-calibred.6 The drop in the
crime rate was reported most noticeable in Metropolitan Manila,
where major crimes decreased by 54 per cent, according to the
Manila Metropolitan Police. In the metropolitan area, homi-
cide supposedly decreased by 70 per cent, while murder declined
by an astounding 168 per cent. Police Chief Gerardo Tamayo
attributed the crime decline to the "saturation campaign" of
the MMP, where slum and squatter areas are "zoned" and police
characters are arrested. The midnight to four o'clock curfew
was also supposed to have helped tremendously.7
2. Governmental reform - almost upon declaration of
martial law, a proposed Reorganization Act that had been pre-
sented to the legislature since March 1972 was decreed into
law. About 6,655 employees were allegedly dismissed or retired
from the service.8 It was claimed that graft and corruption,
especially in the revenue collecting agencies, were severely
curtailed. In a year and a half, the government claims to
have saved 12 24 million in administrative expenses alone, with
personnel reduced by 11 per cent. Noteworthy among the govern-
mental reforms was the creation of the National Economic and
Development Authority which now places planning and implement-
ation under the charge of one agency. A Department of Local
Government and Community Development was also set up. A whole
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system of "think tanks" and "do tanks" was instituted, borrowing
heavily from the military's use of the "task force" for solving
specific problems and concentrating efforts on problems ranging
from rice production to building infrastructures.
Land reform - upon declaration of martial law, the
whole country was declared a land reform area. To date, however,
only 40 of the country's provinces are covered by land reform.
Target beneficiaries of land reform are 650,000 tenant farmers.
Farmers, however, have to join a village association (samahang
nayon) or a co-operative (kilusang hayan) before they are allowed
to participate in land reform. It is claimed that about 15,000
village-associations have been organized in the first year of
martial law but very few co-operativeshave been set up because
the government believes that the farmers have to be trained in
co-operative principies before co-ops are formed. Farmers are
also required to build up the capitalization of the co-op
through "forced savings" before they are officially organized.
An Agrarian Reform Fund of F 7 billion has allegedly been established.
Over-all target in the agricultural sector is doubling of rice
yields in the so-called Masagana 99 program. New land is also
being brought under cultivation in the Palayang Payan program.9
Increased revenue - with martial law, the government
claims to have cracked down on tax evaders and also declared
a number of tax amnesties. Such measures allegedly increased
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revenues by 73.4 per cent in the year since martial law.
Four Presidential Decrees providing tax amnesties claimed to
have netted more than F 830 million. These decrees pardoned
people who did not declare incomes in 1971, 1972 and on taxes on
motor vehicles, provided they would declare their income and
pay their taxes. The good financial position of the government
was also bolstered by considerable foreign exchange earnings
because of the excellent prices offered for Philippine products.
In one year, the international reserves of the Philippines were
said to have increased by 223.4 per cent. Most of the improve-
ments in the country's foreign exchange position was also
attributed to the limits on international travel imposed by
the martial law government.11
5. Increased foreign investments - one of the earliest
acts of the government after martial law was assuring foreign
investors that they_were welcome in the Philippines. The entry
and outflow of foreign investments were liberalized. Oil explor-
ation permits were readily issued, foreign investors were not
required to get any visas, the withholding tax on foreign loans
was decreased, and the repatrigtion of capital and profits by
foreign investors was fully guaranteed. The result of all
these encouragements was the alleged entry of about 24 multi-
national corporations into the Philippines, with an aggregate
investment of F 707.9 million. A tax free export processing
zone was set up in Bataan, where 21 enterprises have been
approved, according to the government. Total project costs
Î.
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of 18 zone enterprises alone were claimed to total P 621.1
million. The generally bullish business atmosphere in
Manila after martial law is seen in the stock market, which
allegedly rea-ched a peak of F 492 million in February 1974,
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almost ten times the average volume before martial law.
6. Improved tourism - with improved peace and order
and a concentrated program to attract Filipinos living abroad
to visit the Philippines, about 246,604 tourists were listed
as having visited the Philippines in theyear after martial
law, an increase of 48 per cent over the previous year.
It was estimated by the government that tourists contributed
$66.4 million to the country receipts. The most dramatic
increases in tourism seem to have occurred after September
1973, after "Operation Homecoming" (Balikbayan) was launched.
Provided vastly red_u_ced homecoming air fares, freedom from taxes
and no customs inspection, more than 35,000 Filipinos allegedly
returned to the Philippines last year. More than 18,000 of
these tourists were claimed to have arrived in the month of
December alone. So successful has Balikbayan been, according
to the Tourism Authority, that it has been extended beyond
its normal dates.13
Critics of the martial law government in the Philippines
may dispute the figures mentioned above and level their accusations
against the propagandists of the present government. It is
difficult to question, however, that there was, indeed, a changed
atmosphere in the Philippines after martial law. In fact,
considering the magnitude of the political changes introduced
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after 21 September 1972, if it were not for the generally
better performance showed by the sectors of Philippine
economy and society mentioned above, it is difficult to believe
that general dissatisfaction with the way things were could
not have grown beyond control. Perhaps, it was mainly because
of the fact that the situation seemed so troubled before martial
law. Perhaps, the simplification of governmental machinery
and the stifling of dissent really did positively result in
change. Whatever the reasons, the Filipino seemed to
have decided that the price for the temporary sacrifice of
civil liberties was indeed right and that he was:willing to
wait a little longer to find out if martial law will really
change his economic and social well being in the long run.
A letter from Manila captures this mood:
For situations such as this, we Filipinos say:
"Bahala na". Bahala na is variously translated:
"Do not worry", "God will provide", "Let's go
for broke". It will take us a bit of time to decide
which meaning we intend.14
The Cons
Aside from the barrage of government publications that
sings praises to martial law, there are many information sources
that debate the so-called benefits arising from the new regime.
Many of these sources are outside the Philippines. Nevertheless,
their sources of information are claimed to originate from
within the country, where traditions of liberal philosophy
and civil liberties refuse to give way.
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Repression and terrorism - critics of martial law
in the Philippines decry the arrest of intellectuals, journalists,
and other critics of the government. Estimates of those imprisoned
range from eight to twelve thousand. In the three month period after
martial law was declared, the Philippine Constabulary admitted
that 8,261 had been arrested. Because of censorship, it may
never be known how many people were really jailed. Nor is it
known how many people are still in jail in the Philippines,
though it was estimated that in the first year of martial law,
about 11,700 had been jailed. More serious than actual numbers,
however, are individual tales of terrorism circulating in the
"underground press". One of the more harrowing of these is the
case of Liliosa Hilao, student leader at the City University
of Manila, who was allegedly tortured to death by the military.
The official military version said she committed suicide.15
Curtailment of civil liberties - the abolition of
Congress, the indefinite postponement of elections, lifting
of the writ of habeas corpus, imposition of curfew, making of
"rumor mongering" a crime, the existence of lists of subversives,
and the control of the mass media by the government and sympath-
izers are considered too high a cost for promised progress by
many. Journalists, especially foreign ones, who wax nostalgic
about the freewheeling style of pre-martial law Philippine
journalism are bored by the non-news that comes out in
Manilals papers daily. Critics complain that there is no
freedom from fear. Rumors fly wildly in the absence of concrete
information. Many members of the "Camp Crame Alumni Association"
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who want to leave the country are not able to travel abroad.
Some of them have found it difficult to make a living in the
Philippines but they cannot get out. Those sympathetic to the
government may say that those facing difficulties now were
those who benefitted from the old society, that they knew
exactly what they were risking when they decided to go against
the government. Still, to these individuals and their families
and friends, life is not easy.
Higher prices - officially, the Consumer Price Index
in Manila was said to have risen from 180.2 in November 1972
to 241.1 in November 1973 (base year, 1965 = 100). Food, how-
ever, went up 258.4 and clothing 246.5. To Filipinos, the
price of rice is the main barometer of well-being. The govern-
ment admits that from F 2.57 per ganta in November 1972, a
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ganta of first class rice went up to P 4.31 in November 1973.
What was worse, in June to September, it was impossible to find
rice in the market and housewives had to line up for blocks
for their rice rations. The government blamed the rice
shortage on an international shortage as well as on local
hoarders but these reasons were not appreciated by the people
who only knew that even if they had the money to buy rice, it
was not available in the market. The "energy crisis" also hit
the country hard and gasoline was rationed.
Muslim insurgency - the spectre of "another Vietnam"
in the Philippines has been widely publicized by the international
press. For all the claims of the government that economic and
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social development in Mindanao is now pacifying the Muslim
separatists, the bombing of Jolo after its capture by rebel
forces and the persistence of a refugee problem are difficult
to keep quiet. Manila papers rarely feature news about
the fighting in Mindanao but rumors are rife. For example,
everytime there is a "brown out", people in Manila whisper
that "they are unloading more casualties at the airport again".
The roots of the Muslim insurgency in the Philippines are
deep and complex and require a very thorough study. The fact
that the Muslims have never really been "pacified" in the
history of the Philippines does not lighten the load of the
present-martial law government in the country. The Muslim
question is a problem that will not easily go away, though it
may be explained clearly in the future.
5. Slow pace of reforms - while the claims of the present
martial la w regime are many, those critical of the government
easily point to the gap between target and accomplishment,
between boast and actual delivery. In many ways, the current
Philippine government gets caught in its own dilemna of big
promises to keep its momentum going and small accomplishments
because of the difficulties of the situation. Land reform is
on the top agenda of the new government and there are grandious
programs promised for the people. Land reform, however, is
an expensive and complex administrative, political and cultural
problem and the resources do not simply seem available at
13.
present to accomplish it in a short time.17 Food production
is another area where promises far outstrip performance. The
dilemna of the martial law government in the Philippines is
that it is trying to accomplish almost instantly what has
taken centuries of neglect and problems to fester. If targets
can only be realistically set, and the drive for quick results
does not lead to grandious promises, perhaps, there won't be
too many frustrations. The problem, however, is that having
assumed power and promised salvation, the government has to
deal in superlatives. This is true of both positive promises
and negative sanctions. Thus, there are constant threats often
difficult to accomplish: those who did not vote in the referendum
will be jailed; tax evaders will be jailed; those caught with
illegal firearms will be shot; etc. When these threats are
not fulfilled, people lose fear and respect, and the credibility
of the regime gets questioned.
6. Domination by foreigners - what sympathizers of the
present regime claim as an accomplishment (increased foreign
investments) is seen by critics as a destructive policy. Those
critical of the increased participation of American and Japanese
multi-national corporations in Philippine economic life cite
the situation in Latin America where centuries of foreign-
dominated trade and commerce has not resulted in indigeneous
growth. The theory of "domination", which claims that the
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trade relationship between rich countries and poor countries
is one between "the shark and the sardine" is cited by critics
of martial law. Often, the technocrats mainly responsible for
formulating and implementing the foreign trade policies of the
Philippines are attacked directly by critics. Thus, Stauffer
has written that:
Philippine experts, even if they have largely forgotten
their Spanish colonial heritage, should have studied
Latin America rather than Singapore, Taiwan and South
Korea for a view of the costs from accepting outside
dominance and guidance of one's econony. The Latin
American experience with its century and a half of
"political independence" coupled with economic depend-
ence demonstrates the weakness of attempting to build
nations through reliance on foreign markets.for products
requiring low levels of technology and on foreign control
of the sophisticated components used in the domestic
economy. The results seem incapable of providing the
stability" foreign investors want in poor nations, and
the minimum economic well being and political respect
every human has a right to expect in the 20th century.18
Some InterpretationE-of Martial Law
To debate the pros and cons of martial law and its signi-
ficance for Philippine development is futile if such a debate
is not placed in the context of Philippine society and history.
Fortunately, despite the initial news clamp down and the media
censorship still in force, it is quite easy to follow the
twists and turns of events related to martial law. The Philippines
remains relatively open, with data accessible to and exportable
by many researchers. There is an alleged "black list" of journalists
and academics who may not be able to enter the country as freely
as others but on the whole, things seem remarkably open.
President Marcos and his sympathizers, in fact, seem almost
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compelled to explain what they have been doing in philosophical,
legal and moral terms. There are hints of the academic ideologue
one can read between the lines of Today's Revolution: Democracy
and Notes on the New Society and there are even promises of
two more books by the President, Constitution and Martial Law
and A Philippine President's Diary. It. is easy to dismiss
these publication_s as propaganda. On the other hand, one
wonders why President Marcos and his followers feel it necessary
to explain themselves so voluminously.
Amidst the claims and counter-claims, charges and counter-
charges, and questions of what is fact and what is fiction, the
all important question on the Philippines under martial law
is still "what does it all mean"? To what factors can martial
law be attributed? What does it portend for future Philippine
development, econom cally and politically?
There is noshortage of "explanations" of what was behind
martial law and what is in store for the Philippines because
of it. First of all, there are the "conspiratorial" interpret-
ations. To critics of martial law, the bl,ame is squarely
placed on the person of President Ferdinand E. Marcos, on his
personal need _for power and wealth, his political cunning, his
needs and drives. Supplementing these types of interpretations
are those which link President Marcos to "foreign devils",
be they multi-national corporations, the Armed Forces of the
United States, the police experts of US AID,,or ,Japanese
businessmen.
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Conspiratorial theories are also given by supporters of
martial law. Among those blamed are Leftists and Rightists
both local and foreign, the "oligarchy", Muslim separatists,
(again, both local and foreign), "warlords", corrupt politicians,
and assorted "subversives", from "Maoists" to "clerico-facists".
A common danger in interpretations of martial law is the
tendency to over-simplify and attribute most developments to
one set of factors. Certainly, it is difficult to deny that
what has happened and what is happening in the Philippines is
due to an extremely complex dynamics of events. It has to be
accepted that to some lesser or greater degree, some of the
factors mentioned by those for and against martial law had
a role in the events. However, to attribute such complex
processes to simplified sets of factors does not contribute
much to understanding what is really going on.
At the risk of falling in the same trap of over-simplification,
this paper attempts to provide some interpretations of recent
events in the Philippines in the following terms:
Recent Philippine events are logical unravellings
of main trends in Philippine political life and
not a drastic break in Philippine history and
traditions;
The role of personalities and factions in recent
Philippine events is an important element in these
trends;
Martial law marks a logical extension of a develop-
mental philosophy which favors administrative over
political rationality; and, finally,
The dynamics of Philippine political processes will
create pressures that will most likely lead to the
eventual lifting of martial law.
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Political Trends
It is tempting to declare, as others have done, that the
imposition of martial law in the Philippines was a drastic
break with the past, "a coup fhichT destroyed the political
institutions of one of the few remaining democracies among
the poor nations of the world",19 or conversely, "a decisive
rupture from an old and stricken society" .20 Martial law,
because of its drastic impact on the lives of many touched by
it personally, is viewed as a beginning or an end. There are
reasons, however, to see it as merely a chapter, although a
very important one, in Philippine history.
To begin with, this is not the first time that militarily-
backed centralized power has been instituted in the Philippines.
The Spanish colonial period was a despotic legacy of military
and religious domin-Wnce. After the "liberating" revolution
against Spain, in fact, the first thing that Emilio Aguinaldo
proclaimed was a military dictatorship. The American colonizers
that took over the Philippine Islands at the turn of the century
preached local government but firmly held on to centralized
control to get things moving. The Commonwealth government set
up in 1935 sought a strong President, that would rule
unencumbered and unembarrassed" by abundant grants of
power. The puppet government under the Japanese during
World War II was martial. And, as President Marcos tirelessly
points out, the old Constitution of the Philippines provided for
martial law under troubled times.
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Contrasted to these long years of centralized and often
military-backed control, the "freedom years" characterized by
elections, free speech, contitutional bills of right, and civil
liberties are brief, indeed. Perhaps, it may be because of this
brevity that there are those who see them as treasured Camelot
days. It may be asked, however, if freedom is so fragile and
liberty so weak that a declaration of martial law will irre-
vocably destroy them.
Instead of martial law being a break with the past, there
are some authors, in fact, who argue that it is a link with
the past. S.P. López, believes that:
The paradox of the New Society is that it aims at
the restoration of the traditional values of Filipino
society which the modern, urbanized Filipino has come
to regard as old-fashioned, outmoded, and rather quaint.
It calls for the reconstruction of Filipino society by
using as building blocks the ancient virtues of our fore-
fathers: individual dignity, social discipline, obedience
to law, rights counterbalanced by responsibility, respect
for the rights of others, honesty, industry, patriotism.21
Another University of the Philippines faculty member,
R.S. Cuyugan, dean of the Asian Center, goes beyond Philippine
history and extends the links to all of Asia, viewing recent
events in the Philippines as "the Philippine return to Asia".
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What happened in September 1972 can be interpreted
as the recovering ... the recovery was, in effect,
the return to Asian ways -- Asian institutions, modes
of decision-making and of forging consensus. Thus,
the declaration of martial law and coming into being
of the New Society put the Philippines back into the
cultural, economic and political mainstream of Asia.
19.
Those who recall more recent, though less pleasant events,
compare the present Philippine situation to the Japanese Occupation
(1941-1945). Indeed, there are many similarities between the two
epochs in Philippine history, some trivial, others seriously
momentous. To those critical of martial law, there are zonas
(police and military raids on certain zones and the rounding up
of opposition elements); pilas (lining up for rice and gasoline
rations); backyard gardens (now called the "Green Revolution");
the "underground" (clandestine publications, guerillas) and even
"collaborators" (those on the side of the ruling forces). Many of
the persons identified with the opposition, in fact, are
veterans of the anti-Japanese struggle. Eleuterio Adevoso, Raul
Manglapus, Joaquin Roces, Bonifacio Gillego, and others were
men who shared the tortures of Fort Santiago or the tough life
in the mountains. So these men, therefore, the struggle may
just be continuing a tradition.
As for the technocrats, the academics turned civil servants
now serving the New Society, theirs is adherence to a tradition
too. American colonization may have introduced rough and
tumble electoral politics but many people also recall the stability,
efficiency and progress of "Peace Time", the pre-independence era
when roads were built, sewers were dug, diseases were eradicated,
education was offered, and honest, hard working civil servants
in white coats and black ties ran the government. Those days
required a reigning Governor General and a Moro "pacification
campaign" too -- yes, with its grim tales of American Army atro-
cities, as well.
20.
Even the young intellectuals waging a "Propaganda Campaign"
in forced or self-imposed exile are following a true Filipino
tradition. Their manifestoes and broadsides that appeal to
restoration of freedom and civil liberties, their stormy meetings
and placard bristling demonstrations seem like echoes from an
earlier time. How many of these young idealists would become
Lunas and del Pilars, Mabinis and Rizals? And how many
of them will be remembered, and for what?
Taking a longer historical perspective, therefore, helps
in putting in context recent events in the Philippines. Such a
long view reveals that such events may be very significant but
that they hardly mean the beginning or the end of freedom in
the country. There are larger and stronger forces in Philippine
history that say, with the ancient poet, "even this shall pass
away". One can only-hope, of course, that whatever transpires
will be for the benefit of the Filipino.
Personalities and Factions
One of the main threads in Philippine politics that may shed
some light on martial law, is the strong factionalism and adherence
to personalistic loyalties that characterize Filipino political
behavior. Almost all analysts of Philippine politics have noted
the aggregation of political loyalties around individual actors.
Bases of aggregation have been kinship to such actors, origin from
a specific geographical region, a common language, and other
particularistic identities. Political relati,onshi,as, according to
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Lande, were structured in dyadic relationships. The "alliances"
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among liders and followers formed the nuclei of political
machines.24
Some authors saw factional political style as a reflection
of pluralism and free expresssion of multi-interests. In time,
a shaky system of "political rules of the game" evolved, which
made elections, parties, legislative deliberations, and politico-
administrative contests possible. The tendency to violate the
rules of the game, however, was never really forgotten. As noted
earlier, the all-or-nothing language of politics might have
provided deeper and more realistic indices to what people really
felt.
The tranformation of verbal over-kill to actual killings
was observed in only a few provinces at first. It is interesting,
as observed by a former Executive Secretary to President Marcos,
that one of the earliest areas where ballots gave way to bullets
was Ilocos, a "hot spot" where casualties became to be expected
at election time. Other provinces soon followed -- Cavite, where
the Montano and Camerino factions battled; Catanduanes and Albay
where the warring factions came from the same family, and the
Muslim provinces, where, upon the declaration of martial law,
political leaders surrendered armored cars, bazookas, and armalite
rifles.
In many of the troubled areas, factionalism and the violence
that came to be associated with it, had deep familial roots. The
killing of a brother or a relative placed an obligation of
revenge on the living. Family feuds fed into political fights,
and vice versa. With these strong feelings, political contests
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were extremely difficult to conduct under gentlemanly rules.
From the blue hills of Kentucky, the island of Sicily, and
the tobacco fields of Ilocos, it has been shown that blood
and violence create their own rules -- and these rarely conform
with peaceful political behavior. Vendettas and all-or-nothing
feuds are not the best conditions for peaceful democratic
processes.
One hesitates to attribute factionalism and violence to
signs of "political decay" in the Philippines. For decay to
occur, there must be health first. The fact is, factionalism and
violence were never too far from the surface in Philippine politics.
The increasing use of arms and private armies had predictable
results -- the breaking down of law and order, and the eventual
imposition of martial controls in the name of law and order.
Under the conditions of armed conflict and civil disorder
that characterized pre-martial law Philippine society, there was
a great need for simplifying things. This simplifying process
eventually focused on the personality of President Marcos and his
family. The vehemence and adulation accorded to President Marcos
and his family in the years before and after martial law are hard
to explain in other than social-psychological terms. In fact, one
can almost say that in view of the confused condition of Philippine
politics before martial law, if President Marcos and his family
did not exist, somebody would have had to invent them.
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From his writings, President Marcos seems singularly
aware of this focusing and polarization of views on his person.
He begins his "Notes on the New Society" in this way:
Great decisions are made for us as much as we make
them ... I am ... accountable to history for September
21, 1972. I cannot escape the sense that events, the
thrust of history ... somehow guided my hand to the
deed ... behind every man who makes history are forces
which blur the distinction between individual initiative
and historical necessity ... 25
The focusing of historical forces on President Marcos was
the work of partisans and opponents alike. To his enemies,
President Marcos was larger than life -- "the richest man in
Asia", "the most crooked Filipino", "the wiliest of politicians".
His exploits ranged from "how he conned the Con-Con delegates"
to his "disassembling of the National Assembly". From his
almost legendary physical courage ("more medals than Audie
Murphy") to his reputed sexual prowess ("the confessions of
Dobie Beams"), President Marcos was a natural for his "super
hero" or "heavy" role. To his adherents, President Marcos
could do no wrong. His opponents, on the other hand, by
attributing so many sins to him, may have created a personality
cult in reverse.
It is difficult to guess whether personalism and factionalism
as shown in recent Philippine events are "Asian" or even whether
they are typical of developing country politics. It was clear in
the years immediately prior to martial law, that there was wide-
spread belief that only a strong hand would be able to impose
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discipline and control over Philippine events. Almost all
the justifications written of martial law point to the
anarchy, disorder, violence and confusion of the times. In
some ways, the ready acceptance of martial law by many Filipinos
might be attibuted to this demand for order -- and the larger
than life proportions that the supporters and critics of
President Marcos created of him may have provided the answer
to a specific historical need.
The Technocrats
If personalism and factionalism can be termed Asian, one
of the main influences on the martial law government in the
Philippines today is definitely "imported". This is the idea
that a group of trained, skilled, impersonal and rational
individuals, divorced from politics, factions and particular-
istic interests are_the instruments by which economic and social
development may be achieved. The ideal of an apolitical civil
service of good men, selected, trained and promoted strictly
according to merit, is an old one. The Chinese mandarins and
British colonial civil servants are historical attempts to
achieve this ideal. The idea, however, that a classless
civil service drawn from all interested persons, selected by
systems of examinations and promoted strictly according to
skills and competence is a peculiarly American one. It may
be closely related to the similar idea that there is a group
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of civic-minded citizens in every community who would work
for the public welfare from selfless and idealistic concerns
and who would not demean themselves or soil their reputations
by using public office for private gain.
As the only American colony, the Philippines became the
testing ground for these twin ideals of civic politics and a
civil service based on merit. Both ideals found conver-
gence in the hope that education was the key to economic and
social progress. The accomplishments of the Philippine public
school system in the half century of American rule are commendable.
Even after independence, the educational establishment became one
of the main mou3ders of public life. With the commercial and
industrial sectors not able to flourish as actively as desired,
government became the main "industry" to employ the thousands
of educated graduate-s. Education as the main ladder for economic
and social mobility did not end in the country -- a system of
scholarships and grants (the pensionado system), extended
higher education to the United States and, to a limited extent,
to Europe. In the early years, when a political career promised
both fame and fortune, many of the scholars went into politics.
However, as politics became corrupt, soiled and demeaning,
many of the scholars turned to academic pursuits, private
business, and, eventually, to the civil service.
The philoscphical and value premises of the academics
turned civil servants who are active in the martial law
government in the Philippines at present are those which
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reflect the "value-free" and "rational" ideals of American
reformers. Implicitly or explici.tly, the "technocrats", as
they have become more popularly known, abhor the open conflicts
and excesses óf electoral politics. Philosophically, they are
committed to rationalism as an ends-means relationship.
Emotionally, they are drawn to the idea of the self-less,
objective, meritorious civil servant with his "passion for
anonymity" efficiently doing his appointed task. Borrowing
from Herbert Simon, most of the technocrats probably believe in
the fact-value dichotomy. Political representatives of the
people set the goals (values); they as civil servants go about
the business of achieving those goals using facts in the best
cost-benefit tradition. It does not really matter, in the long
run, who sets those goals. An elective chamber or a "consti-
tutional authoritartan" are the same -- they set the course
and the technocrats busy themselves with getting there.
Development administration theorists committed to rational
problem solving (as well as business administration savants who
advocate running government agencies like efficient corporations)
will probably cringe at the thought of their ideas being used by
strong men, dictators and authoritarian leaders, but the truth is
that the military-technocratic alliance is becoming one of the
most widely known power bases in most developing countries today.
In Peru, Chile, Greece, Nigeria, Indonesia, and now, the Philippines
the new power holders are the technocrats. A publication not
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overly sympathetic to the technocrats in the Philippines
describes the situation in this way:
One of the major effects of martial law in the
Philippines was the transfer of power from war-
lord politicians ... to a new breed of technocrats
who now have a pivotal role in policy formation,
both in domestic affairs and international nego-
tiations. These technocrats were almost always
invariably drawn from UP or Ateneo products in the
middle or late fifties who trained abroad, mostly
in the US Ivy League and top universities for
their Ph,D's or MBA's and later returned to the
Philippines to serve as deans and directors in the
major universities as well as consultants to big
corporations ... Now they call the shots in the
New Society by running the sensitive and powerful
offices of the regime such as the Board of Invest-
ments, Department of Finance, and the newly created
National Economic and Development Authority. They
reportedly have no "political clout" and the sole
basis of their appointment is their technical
expertise.26
Prominently mentioned among the "new power holders" are
César Virata, secretary of finance (Wharton); Vicente Paterno,
chairman of board of investments (Harvard); Gerardo Sicat,
director general, NEDA (MIT), Orlando Sacay, assistant secretary
for cooperatives (Cornell); Arturo Tangco, secretary of
agriculture (Harvard); Onofre D. Córpuz, coordinator for human
settlements development (Harvard); Rom6n Cruz, Jr., manager,
government service insurance system (Harvard); and others.
It credits the technocrats' role in the New Society by saying
that "so prominent is the role of these technocrats that the
public usually alludes to the 'Harvard Mafia' ... in talking
about them". It may be scant consolation to Harvard University
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that aside from turning out Arab technocrats who have turned
their learning to the oil embargo and the "energy crisis" it
is now being credited with Filipino technocrats who hold the
powers in a martial regime.
Though many people admire the hard work, dedication, and
concrete results achieved by the technocrats, there are also
some detractors who see them as servile followers of the powers
that be. The resurgence of American and Japanese business
dominance in the Philippines is worrying some people, and they
attribute this to the technocrats. One criticism charges
that "their neo-colonial orientation toward economic develop-
ment and their willingness to commit the resources of Philippine
economy to foreign exploitation" would lead the Philippines to
ruin. The charges warn that "their servility to foreign interests
and readiness to accommodate foreign domination under the guise
of internal economic development should .. be a cause of alarm
among Filipinos".27
Conversations with the technocrats readily reveal their
sincerely felt desire for progress as well as a strong reformist
streak. To most of them, the restoration of stability under
martial law provides "the chance to do something". With no more
Congress and professional politicians, government has become
a simple ends-means framework. President Marcos sets the
goals, the technocrats suggest the means, and they simply
proceed to theoptimal way of translating plans to action.
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A year and a half under martial law, however, this
idealized simple view of politics-free administration is slowly
proving to be troublesome. In their private moments, the
technocrats admit that their "think tanks" and "do tanks"
are not sufficient to achieve the goals they have set --
goals set very high, to begin with, because of high expectations
from the people.
In his study of the American presidency, Neustadt noted
the expectation of President Eisenhower that as in the army,
all he had to do as President was to say "do this, do that"
and things will happen.28 He contrasted this expectation with
the realism of Harry Truman, the politician, who commiserated
with "poor Ike" because things would not automatically happen.
In the Philippines, it is increasingly becoming clear that
even with martial_lqw powers, when President Marcos says
do this, do that" things do not necessarily happen. Decrees
have been drafted and signed, to be followed in a disconcertingly
short time later with amending, clarifying, or even contradictory
decrees, implementing orders, or letters of instruction. Orders
have been given from the clear vantage point of Malacahang Palace
in Manila, but they have been changed, revised and altered as
they have rippled away toward the provinces by various cases
of miscommunication, partial implementation, ignorance, and
acts of commission or omission. It is true that with organizational
reform, the lines of authority in the Philippine bureaucracy have
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been shortened. Still, the technocrats are encountering a lot
of static and noise in their communication and authority lines.
Administrative rationality may have replaced political
rationality in the Philippines under martial law but along with
it has come about administrative politics as well. In reality,
technocrats do not have equal access to the President and this
determines their effectiveness in public life. Personal, pro-
fessional and other rivalries, of course, are usually hidden
and smoothened over but they are there. Professional watchers
of bureaucratic careers are aware that the meteoric rise of
one particular technocrat usually follows a path strewn with
sore tos, aching arms and bruised egos. Thus, though open
conflicts are rare and there are few shouting matches such
as those in past congressional or electoral contests, the
tensions and intra-bureaucratic conflicts are there, and they
make their particular noises in their peculiar ways.
It is clear that the presence of technocrats in the govern-
ment of President Marcos has assisted him immensely. In the
education-conscious Philippines, all those advanced degrees
and academic robes spell knowledge, dedication, civic conscience
and performance. The "best brains" of the country are now
harnessed by government. Planners and doers have replaced
politicians. With very rare exceptions, there is no scandal
or any whiff of corruption or dishonesty among the technocrats.
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To Filipinos who have been made cynical by the political
excesses of yesteryears, this is an unaccustomedly beneficial
situation.
Prospects for the Future
In the light of the admittedly fragmentary and incomplete
analysis of martial law in the Philippines, the logical question
to ask is: what is in store for the near future? In this writer's
opinion, martial law cannot last too long in the Philippines.
There are too many pressure, both within and without the system,
that will most likely bring about the lifting of martial law.
One of the strongest sources of pressures is the Church.
It is one of the ironies of the Philippine situation that while
martial law was declared to allegedly prevent a godless
Communist takeover, some of the more recent opposition to the
New Society is comirig from men of God. In an official govern-
ment report religious groups critical of the government were
29dismissed as "clerico-fascists". While it is true that a
number of priests have emulated the example of Camilo
Torres (the Colombian rebel prid-st), the roster of people signing
open letters critical of the present situation does not warrant
the easy dismissal of activities of the religious as mainly
coming from rebels.
One of the early critics of martial law was Rev. Pacífico
Ortíz, delegate to the Constitutional Convention, former Dean
of the Ateneo La w School and Chaplain to the late President
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Manuel L. Quezón. Fr. Ortiz, saying "no" to the Constitution
which would set up a transition from a presidential to a
parliamentary form of government said that ...
....we as delegates, have no right to aSk our
people to play dice with their future, to gamble
with their freedom on a dictatorial experiment.
For the transition government we are setting up
is not a transition from the Presidential to the
Parliamentary; it is a transition from the Presi-
dential to-the Dictatorial, to a one-man consti-
tutional-Dictatorship. And thoughwe call it
transitory, this transition government may not
transit at all; it may well become our permanent
way of life, as it has become in many of the South
American republics ... Silent leges inter arma is
the Latin phrase for it - the law stands mute in
the midst of arms. In the climate of fear that
martial law has brought about, the ancient oracles
of freedom and decency and independent judgment are
silent ... and lesser men must fall back on theb own
unaided conscience and reckon by the stars ...
More recently, a group of 23 Protestant and Catholic
churchmen under the leadership of Rev. Cirilo A. Rigos,
wrote an open letter to Secretary Carlos P. Rómulo, (Foreign
Affairs) expressing strong views on Philippine-Japan relations.
This letter, dated January 9, 1974, was strongly critical of
the possible domination by Japan of the Philippine economy upon
signing of the amity treaty between the two countries.31
Recent events have reported formal protests from high
officials of the Church regarding military raids on convents,
universities, and seminaries. Open letters from bishops have
been circulated and printed in international media and
"underground
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papers", . So far, the government has been able
to blame much of religious agitation on "for6ign'agitators" and
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the list of priests arrested show a predominance of Irish and
Italian names. There are, however, many young Filipino priests
and nuns who have been energized by the activism among students
and young professionals before martial law. With the support
of their superiors, these religious men and women can wield
tremendous pressures which the military-technocratic alliance
would not be able to ignore.
Another pressure which may result in the lifting of
martial law may very well be the military itself. One of the
main items of speculation on the future of the Philippines is
what role the military will play in a long term martial regime.
There is unanimity that before martial law, the military
played only a minor role in the country's politics. The main
interest of the military in the past, according to many observers,
was to perpetuate themselves. Thus, Lachica expressed the view
that if the Huks did not exist in Central Luzon, the military
would have had to invent them -- especially at budget time.33
President Marcos, in his pronouncements since martial law,
has consistently expressed his contempt at the demeaning of
the military and has rallied to their side. Thus, in a recent
publication, he wrote:
In the complacency and arrogance of the past, our
political elite had reduced the annual testimony
of the defense establishment before the Philippine
Congress into a comic opera. The media elite, on the
other hand, had their so-called "budgetary Huks", or
Huks concocted for the purpose of increasing the
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Department of National Defense budget. But it had
always been a source of scandal for me that the very
Congress which expended the people's money in indiscrimi-
nate investigations of "subversives" in various organ-
izations was the very same Congress which exposed the
military to ridicule whenever the lattg testified about
the state of rebellion in the country.3
President Marcos now sees that " ... the perception of
the armed forces about the state of rebellion was more acute
than that of the civilian authority ... "; " ... it was the
armed forces that offered lives in the fight against the
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insurgents ... . The President has expressed his decision
to rely more and more on the military to maintain peace and
order and to prevent any "backsliding" to the bad habits
of the past.
So far, the military has been loyal to the government and
its actions have been remarkably free of violence andabuses.
Like the technocrats, military officers seem genuinely imbued
with a reformist intent and a "let's get the job done" motivation.
It is difficult to predict, however, what continued reliance
on the military would do. Already, there are accusations of
favors being given to the army to maintain its loyalty. With
the increase of such criticisms, it is difficult to expect
that the military would keep its cool.
Critics of the increasing reliance on the military to firm
up martial law fear a Latin American type dictatorship dependent
on military strength. There is also fear of abuses on the
part of the military, and the growing need to appease the
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military's needs. Thus, an undergound paper published in
North America charges that even private property is being
grabbed" by President Marcos for distribution to soldiers.
An item in the Times-Chronicle-Free Press ("published ... to
keep alive the spirit ... of the mass media suppressed by the
Marcos dictatorship") charges that "Carmel Farms, ... owned
by a critic of the President" had been confescated by the
Government through Proclamation Decree No. 293 and was given
away to officers and men of the presidential guard battallion.36
Unlike pressures from religious goups which may work toward
lifting of martial law to achieve something, pressures
emanating from the question of the military may result in the
same end by the need to prevent something. Judging from Latin
American, African and other cases where authoritarian leaders
have had to rely on the military for support, a time usually
comes when the role of the military has to be counter-balanced
by another group, perhaps, the religious, citizen groups, local
government officials, etc. When the balancing act becomes too
difficult, as it eventually and inevitably becomes, authoritarian
leaders usually shift to a broader base of power. From present
indications, this may be what is in store for the Philippines,
where demands for legitimacy and legality have remained very
strong.
A careful examination of the course that President Marcos
has taken so far makes for bright hopes that martial law will be
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ended earlier than anticipated. It is noticeable, for
example, that the President has been almost painstakingly
careful in justifying his action in a legal-constitutional
manner rather than relying mainly on naked power or brute force.
The Old Constitution and the New Constitution are constantly
referred to in almost all pronouncements. Plebiscites and
referanda are used both to gain support, legitimize actions,
and show political power and mobilization skills. At any time
that the power holders in the Philippines want to, there is
the stucture of a National Assemby which may be convened as
a formal legislature. The parliamentary form of government
is also there to lend legitimacy to President Marcos' continu-
ance in power.
In the final analysis, though, the forces that will
probably lift martial law and restore some semblance of normalcy
to Philippine politics would be a combination of external
pressures, internal threats, and hard earned progress. Continued
criticism of President Marcos and the martial law government
may stiffen resistance but it may also firm up the government's
resolve to achieve progress to make it possible and safe to
shift to a less controlled governmental structure. External
pressures from various sectors, especially from the United
States, may also achieve results. After all, the continued
existence of martial law and denial of civil liberties in the only
American colony and "show window of democracy in Asia" is a
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constant embarrassment to America. It is the Filipino people,
though, who will eventually have to determine their own future.
Knowing the values and traditions Of the Filipinos, their
sense of justice and love of freedom, it is almost unthinkable
that martial law will be their legacy for all time.
--oo00oo--
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